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Emerging Patterns of Global Constitutionalization:
Toward a Conceptual Framework
KAROLINA MILEWICZ*
ABSTRACT
Global constitutionalization is a recent phenomenon that is decisively changing
the character of the international order. This argument was put forward recently by
scholars of international law and has gained significance in the institutional school of
thought. However, the notion of "global constitutionalization" is often used impre-
cisely and has so far been largely neglected in the field of international relations. It still
lacks a consistent and operational definition, which would enable political scientists
and international relations scholars to conduct empirical research. This article explores
a preliminary framework for the concept ofglobal constitutionalization.
INTRODUCTION
An exploration of the patterns of global constitutionalization raises a number
of important questions. What is a constitution? What is global constitutionaliza-
tion? How do we get a handle on the concept? Whether their background is po-
litical or legal, researchers responding to the question "what does a constitution
address?" primarily list characteristics that are typically associated with constitu-
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tions in nation-states. Depending on the research objective, most scholars would
consider the issues of written versus unwritten constitutions (writtenness), flexible
versus rigid constitutions (rigidity), political revolution versus continuous evolu-
tion, the rule of law, division of powers, checks and balances, containment, the
incorporated governmental structure, the hierarchy of law, and some basic politi-
cal and civil rights as the fundamental features of a constitutional debate.'
When a definition of "global constitutionalization" is requested, no straightfor-
ward pattern-fitting reply can be expected. Initially, the concept of "constitutional-
ization beyond the state" was addressed in the context of European integration.2
However, processes of constitutionalization are not unique to the European Union
(EU). Recently, the concept has gained considerable attention on the international
plane. Scholars of international law concur that the normative idea of global consti-
tutionalism and global constitutionalization are recent phenomena, decisively
changing the character of the global order. When the need to define global constitu-
tionalization arises, any attempt at a common definition causes disagreement.'
1. See generally AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND PERFOR-
MANCE IN THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES (1999); Ruth Gavison, What Belongs in a Constitution?, 13 CONST.
POL. ECON. 89 (2002); Anne Peters, Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of
Fundamental International Norms and Structures, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 579 (2006); Giovanni Sar-
tori, Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 853 (1962).
2. EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE (J.H.H. Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003).
3. Some researchers stress the blurred boundary between national politics and international law.
In this manner, the core of constitutionalism is conceived by Thomas Cottier and Maya Hertig as in-
terfacing different layers of governance from the local to the global level. See Thomas Cottier & Maya
Hertig, The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism, 7 MAX PLANCK Y.B.U.N.L. 261 (Armin von
Bogdandy & Rtidiger Wolfrum eds., 2003). For Frank Schorkopf and Christian Walter, global consti-
tutionalism reflects the shift from an "actor-centered" concept of international law focusing on the
regulation of relations between sovereign states, to a "subject-centered" understanding of interna-
tional law denoting the regulation of specific subject matters, such as trade, security, and environ-
ments, and questions the boundary between general international law and national constitutional law.
See Frank Schorkopf & Christian Walter, Elements of Constitutionalization: Multilevel Structures of
Human Rights Protection in General International and WTO-Law, 4 GERMAN L.J. 1359, 1361, 1373
(2003). Anne Peters defines global constitutionalization as a legal instrument compensating for the
ongoing de-constitutionalization on the domestic level. See Peters, supra note 1, at 580. Though states
are not considered to have ceased to be primary actors in the international system, the claim is that the
role of states with respect to constitutional processes and objectives is being challenged by the forces of
globalization or denationalization. See DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR? (1997);
JAMES N. ROSENAU, ALONG THE DOMESTIc-FoREIGN FRONTIER: EXPLORING GOVERNANCE IN A TURBU-
LENT WORLD (1997); MICHAEL ZURN, REGIEREN JENSEITS DES NATIONALSTAATES (1998); Oliver Gersten-
berg, Denationalization and the Very Idea of Democratic Constitutionalism: The Case of the European
Community, RATIO JURIS, Sept. 2001, at 298. In this sense, state constitutions no longer regulate the
totality of governance in a comprehensive way and thus are no longer "total constitutions."
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Due to the variety of definitions proposed by scholars of international law, the
concept of global constitutionalization still lacks clarity. Although its importance
grew in the legal discipline and became the subject of discussion at the start of the
twenty-first century, there is no consensus about the meaning of global constitu-
tionalization. This is not only the case for the international law discipline, but
also, and even more so, in the field of international relations.
Until recently, the concept of global constitutionalization was widely disre-
garded by scholars of international relations. The concept, however, concerns the
scholarly sphere of international relations to the same extent as it does interna-
tional law. Global constitutionalization must be taken into consideration when
questions on the shape of the international order,4 as well as its determinants, are
raised. From the viewpoint of an empiricist, it is important to translate this rather
Similarly, constitutionalism in neo-liberal tradition is seen as a shift from a statist to a global frame-
work driven by globalist social forces, including non-state actors, with an interest in free trade (see,
e.g., Michael H. Allen, Globalization and Peremptory Norms in International Law: From Westphalian to
Global Constitutionalism?, 41 INT'L POL. 341 (2004)), which involves the "retreat of the state" and as-
cribes international agreements a quasi-constitutional effect (e.g., Stephen Gill, Constitutionalizing
Inequality and the Clash of Globalizations, INT'L STUD. REV., Summer 2002, at 47, 59-60). Others apply
the concept of global constitutionalization in the field of international trade by focusing on social
practices to constrain political behavior, as well as the role of judicial power and review. See, e.g.,
DEBORAH Z. CASS, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGITIMACY,
DEMOCRACY, AND COMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM (2005); Robert Howse & Ka-
lypso Nicolaidis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?, 16 GOVER-
NANCE 73 (2003); Hannes L. Schloemann & Stefan Ohlhoff, "Constitutionalization" and Dispute
Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 424 (1999); Bern-
hard Zangl, Is There an Emerging International Rule of Law?, 13 EUR. REV. 73 (2005). By contrast, in-
ternational constitutionalism, conceptualized in a more encompassing manner, refers to the
fundamental structure and substantive norms of the international legal order as a whole (e.g., Erika
de Wet, The Emergence of International and Regional Value Systems as a Manifestation of the Emerging
International Constitutional Order, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 611 (2006); Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitu-
tions of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 623 (2006)), first focusing on the common constitutional princi-
ples, such as the separations of powers, the rule of law and arguably even democracy, and second by
bringing international law into greater conformity with individual constitutional rights (see, e.g.,
CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL REGULATION (Christian Joerges & Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2006); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, Constitutionalism and the
World Trade Organization: Challenges for World Trade Organization Jurisprudence and Civil Society, 19
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 634,641 (2006)).
4. For a discussion of the international order and corresponding polarization of the concept of
global constitutionalization and empire, see G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY: INSTITUTIONS,
STRATEGIC RESTRAINT, AND THE REBUILDING OF ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS 10-29 (2000); Jean L.
Cohen, Whose Sovereignty? Empire Versus International Law, ETHICS & INT'L AFF., Dec. 2004, at 1;
Michael Zurn, Institutionalisierte Ungleichheit in der Weltpolitik. Jenseits der Alternative "Global
Governance" versus "American Empire", 48 POL. VIERTELJ. 680 (2007).
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normative concept into a consistent notion and a scientifically settled and opera-
tional definition that enables comparative political scientists and international re-
lations scholars to conduct empirical research.
This article explores a preliminary conceptual framework of global constitu-
tionalization with an eye toward approaching a consistent and scientifically oper-
ational definition of the concept that social scientists can cope with. The aim is
not to prove the existence of global constitutionalization, nor to examine current
developments in international law or the national and international conditions
that might favor or hinder the emergence of a global constitutional setting. Rather,
I discuss the basic, but essential, issue of how to conceptualize global constitution-
alization so as to achieve an operational framework. Aiming at an operational
scaffold for scholars of both political science and international relations, the un-
derlying questions are: What are the basic characteristics of global constitutional-
ization? And how can these be captured empirically?
The article argues that global constitutionalization can be captured in terms
of international relations as the "institutionalization of international norms,"
namely the process of the emergence, creation, and identification of constitution-
like elements.' This parallels the historical evolution of human rights in domestic
law and refers to a process through which international norms are established.
This article begins with the notions of constitution, constitutionalism, and
constitutionalization as originally developed in the nation-state setting. If we are
to speak of global constitutionalization, the typology must incorporate three fun-
damental constitutional elements. First, the emergence of a global constitution
must be considered to be a continuous and lasting process, rather than an ad hoc
event. Second, there must be a formal dimension that denotes some procedural
and institutional norms that structure the legal system, that is, the rule of law.
Third, global constitutionalization must have a substantive dimension associated
with the guarantee of fairness and security. Combining these three elements, this
article argues that the emergence of a global constitutional order can be divided
into three temporally distinct sub-processes of global constitutionalization. While
the constitutionalization of formal norms (formal constitutionalization) 6 is ex-
pected to emerge first, substantive constitutionalization, the institutionalization of
civil-political rights and, later, socio-economic rights, comes to the fore only at a
second stage. The final stage stands for the most encompassing form of global
5. See de Wet, supra note 3, at 611-12; Peters, supra note 1, at 582; Petersmann, supra note 3;
Zirn, supra note 4.
6. For the definition of types of global constitutionalization, see infra Part II.
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constitutionalization containing both formal and substantive elements (encom-
passing global constitutionalization). I conclude by stressing the operational view-
points of such a global constitutional framework.
I. ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS
To better understand what global constitutionalization is and how it differs
from other related approaches, I first turn to the conceptual distinctions between
the terms constitution, constitutionalism, and constitutionalization as originally
defined in the nation-state setting.
A. Constitution
Although the term constitution is associated first and foremost with the nation-
state, this notion lacks a clear and decisive definition. The understanding of this term
differs according to national traditions.7 Sartori described the term constitution as
something vague and not easily simplified.8 Many state constitutions, however, follow
comparable Western templates, which have some basic principles and functions.
First, state constitutions are linked by some formal characteristics. Constitutions
have emerged either through a constitutional big bang, which aimed to end political
or social revolutions (as in France),9 or they were created to avert a revolution and re-
store certain pre-revolutionary conditions (as in the German Reich of 1871-1918)."o
Still others have evolved over centuries, such as the British constitution."
A further essential element of a constitution is its writtenness. Although most
state constitutions are written legal charters (exceptions include the British, Israeli
and New Zealand constitutions), the notion of constitution cannot be bound only to
its writtenness l In addition, a constitution is characterized by its precedence over
7. See Gavison,supra note 1, at 90; Ulrich K. Preuss, Constitutionalism, in ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (E. Craig ed., 1998), available at http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/
SO13?ssid=745432242&n= 1#.
8. See Sartori,supra note 1, at 853.
9. See generally ORATEURS DE LA RiVOLUTION FRAN4AISE: LES CONSTITUANTS (Frangois Furet &
Ran Halvi eds., 1989).
10. See ERNST R. HUBER, DEUTSCHE VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE (1960).
11. See Peters,supra note 1, at 585. See generally GEORGE BURTON ADAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF ENGLAND (1934); WILLIAM STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND IN ITS ORIGIN AND
DEVELOPMENT: SELECTIONS (1979).
12. See generally Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution -Making Process, 45 DUKE
L.J. 364,365 (1995).
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ordinary law, ensuring a special procedure for amending constitutional provisions
and safeguarding it against modification through ordinary legislation or judicial
review. 3 In this sense, constitutions can have a different degree of rigidity. With re-
spect to constitutional amendments, they can be constructed either as rigid constitu-
tions or as flexible constitutions, depending on the required approval mechanism. 4
Second, formal elements of a constitution imply that constitutions have to
fulfill related procedural functions. Generally speaking, constitutions refer to the
bulk of basic legal norms organizing and institutionalizing a polity, and therefore
concern the regulation of the basic institutions of a polity that occupy the center of
the community's life." Following Georg Jellinek, constitutions set in place politi-
cal institutions and define their competences. They lay down the terms of mem-
bership and the relation between the members and the community and regulate
the institutions' core functions of lawmaking, conflict resolution, and law enforce-
ment."6 In other words, constitutions constitute a political entity as a legal entity,
organize it, limit political power, offer political and moral guidelines, justify gov-
ernance, and contribute to integration.7
The link between constitutions and political institutions can also be captured
by the concept of the rule of law as legally employed in the Anglo-American con-
text. The rough equivalent used in Europe is known in German as Rechtsstaat or
in French as 6tat de droit. The rule of law reflects a common idea in the various
concepts of constitution and means "that the state's bodies act according to the
prescriptions of law, and law is structured according to principles restricting
arbitrariness."'8 In a rule of law system the special relationship between the
branches of power is guaranteed. Simply put, the set of formal rules that consti-
tute law must be obeyed, implying that a political community lives under the rule
of law and not under the rule of men.9 According to a standard formulation by
13. See JAMES BRYCE, Essay III: Flexible and Rigid Constitutions, in STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURIS-
PRUDENCE 124, 167-73 (1901).
14. See LIJPHARTsupra note 1, at 218-23.
15. See Gavison, supra note 1, at 89; Peters, supra note 1, at 581, 585; Neil Walker, Posnational
Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation, in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE
STATE,supra note 2, at 27, 33-35.
16. See GEORG JELLINEK, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 505 (1914).
17. See ANNE PETERS, ELEMENTE EINER THEORIE DER VERFASSUNG EUROPAS 38-92 (2001).
18. See ANDRS SAj6, LIMITING GOVERNMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONALISM 205
(1999).
19. Id. at 206; see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994); Josk M. Maravall & Adam
Przeworski, Introduction to DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 1 (Jos6 M. Maravall & Adam Przewor-
ski eds., 2003).
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Lon Fuller, the list of formal requirements for this set of rules that constitute law,
are norms that are general, publicly promulgated, not retroactive, clear and un-
derstandable, logically consistent, feasible, and stable over time.20
B. Constitutionalism
Constitutionalization should, in normative terms, account for more than sim-
ple formal elements regulating, in the international context, for example, relation-
ships between nation-states as well as between nation-states and international
organizations. Although constitutions restrict the will of authorities and prevent
them from misusing power, neither a constitution nor the embedded idea of the
rule of law are absolute categories. The very idea of restriction and containment
implies that citizens are at the mercy of the government's impersonal and formal
legal procedures. Strictly applied, a constitution and the historically narrow con-
ception of the rule of law, as defined above, allow for no consideration of equity or
the human condition.
2
'
Therefore, it is important to address the term constitutionalism itself.22 Origi-
nally, constitutionalism described a political movement and an intellectual trend
in the quest for a written constitution during the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies. It aimed at making the political power (monarchy) subject to law and at
creating a government of laws and not of men. Today constitutionalism is a value-
laden concept and refers to the inclusion of basic substantive principles.
23
The concept of constitutionalism goes beyond the simple articulation of for-
mal rules and procedures of a constitution. It defines rights of, and obligations to,
individuals and thus refers to human dignity and the guarantee of fundamental
rights to individuals. According to J.H.H. Weiler and Marlene Wind, constitu-
tionalism "embodies the values, often non-stated, which underlie the material and
institutional provisions in a specific constitution.
' 24
By uncoupling the term constitutionalism from the notion of constitution, it is
20. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (1964).
21. See SAj6,supra note 18, at 207-11.
22. Cf. Gerhard Casper, Constitutionalism, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
473 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986); Preuss, supra note 7.
23. See Peters, supra note 1, at 582; see also Martti Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism as Mindset:
Reflections on Kantian Themes About International Law and Globalization, 8 THEORETICAL INQUI-
RIES L. 8 (2007).
24. J.H.H. Weiler & Marlene Wind, Introduction: European Constitutionalism Beyond the State,
in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE, supra note 2, at 1, 3.
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possible to capture constitutionalism as a term connecting and accounting for a vin-
dication of neo-Kantian values and the idea of Rechtsstaat.25 On the one hand, there
is the formal rule of law. This is the institutionalization of procedures that refer to
the concept of legality or legal authorization. On the other hand, there is the value-
laden conception of the fundamental rights that should be guaranteed in a classic
constitution. Therefore, unlike the notion of constitution, the principle of constitu-
tionalism comprises both the requirement of legal certainty and the protection of
acquired rights and legitimate expectations. Moreover, by including substantive ele-
ments, constitutionalism can both diminish the rule of law's one-sided inflexibility
and the rule of law's alienation from real life. The idea of constitutionalism contains
formal and substantive elements that together account for equality in the rule of law
and the realization of equality in both form and content.26
C. Constitutionalization
Most written constitutions were developed in reaction to revolution or revolu-
tionary movements pushing for a constitution. The accomplishment and refinement
of a constitution is, in contrast, a long-term process taking into account the experi-
ence of constitutional violation, restriction of freedom and oppression, as well as the
questionable practices of unsuccessful and despotic governments. It is precisely this
requirement for process over time that can be derived from the principle of constitu-
tionalization. Unlike the static language of the formal and substantive characteris-
tics that form the basis of constitutionalism, constitutionalization indicates an
underlying process. It embeds a time dimension, which means that a constitution or
constitutional law can come into being as part of a process over time. Constitution-
alization implies that a legal text can acquire or may eventually lose constitutional
properties in a feedback process and can thus be a long-lasting development. It indi-
cates a process encompassing the emergence, creation, and identification of constitu-
tion-like elements. In short, it denotes a constitution-in-the-making.27
Two further conceptual notes on constitutionalization are in order. First, while
constitutionalism describes a "mindset" or what Weiler calls an "academic artifact
28
denoting what (international) law ought to be, constitutionalization describes the
25. Id.
26. See SAj6,supra note 18, at 208, 217.
27. See Peters, supra note 1, at 582.
28. J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE 223 (1999); see Koskenniemi, supra note 23, at
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concrete process of developing the (global) constitutional order.29 Second, constitu-
tionalization should not be put on par with legalization." Although both concepts
refer to the process of creating legal arrangements, they differ with regard to the
type of legal process they induce and the scope of legal arrangements they cover.
Legalization refers to the formal practices creating legal arrangements that gain
binding force through bureaucratic details, such as precision, the degree of obliga-
tion, and the possibility of delegation.3' Constitutionalization, to the contrary, covers
a much broader process. It not only refers to the formal process,32 but also political
and social practices that establish law-like rules and institutions in the (international)
community.33 Thus, it raises considerably more substantial questions about the sys-
temic and substantive quality of international law.34
D. Bringing It Together
Starting from the nation-state perspective, this article has relied on the three-
fold distinction between constitution, constitutionalism, and constitutionaliza-
tion. From this, it was possible to extract three elements that should be considered
in conceptualizing a global constitutionalist framework. First, a constitutional
system cannot exist without the rule of law; therefore, the concept of global con-
stitutionalization should include some formal norms ensuring legitimate gover-
nance. Second, the rigidity of the rule of law system must be offset by substantive
values that facilitate the effective endorsement of the public well-being of a politi-
29. See Richard Bellamy & Dario Castiglione, Introduction: Constitutions and Politics, 44 POL.
STUD. 413, 414 (1996); Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Redefining Sovereignty via International Constitu-
tional Moments?, in REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE OF FORCE AFTER THE COLD WAR 335, 346-
48 (Michael Bothe et al. eds., 2005).
30. See Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401, 401 (2000).
31. Id.
32. See Martha Finnemore & Stephen J. Toope, Alternatives to "Legalization": Richer Views of
Law and Politics, 55 INT'L ORG. 743, 750 (2001).
33. See Antje Wiener, Editorial: Evolving Norms of Constitutionalism, 9 EUR. L.J. 1, 8 (2003).
34. Constitutionalization as a process of creating constitution-like elements also contrasts with
the moment of constitutional creation. The "constitutional moment" refers to the act of constitu-
tion-making in a revolutionary event. See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional
Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989). In a recent contribution, Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-
White have denoted the fight against terror to be an "international constitutional moment." They
argued that the global events following September 11, 2001 galvanized the international system to
action in a short period of time, consequently giving rise to new rules transforming international
norms on the prohibition of the use of force. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White,
The International Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2002).
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cal community. Finally, a framework for the emerging global constitutionalism
must be tied to the idea of process and must not be restricted to the vision of at-
taining an exclusive final good that resembles a completed constitutional system.
A global constitutional system is not an ad hoc event, but rather a process of con-
tinuous development.
II. CONSTITUTIONALIZATION BEYOND THE STATE
Despite a discussion primarily rooted in the national setting, the terms consti-
tution, constitutionalism, and constitutionalization are not exclusively applicable
to the nation-state.3" It should be possible to transfer them to a setting beyond the
nation-state following the three characteristics: the formal dimension; the sub-
stantive dimension; and the time dimension.
With regard to the international level, I refer to global constitutionalization as
the process toward the institutionalization of international legal norms. Such a pro-
cess implies the emergence, creation, and identification of two distinct constitutional
elements that regulate international politics: institutional and organizational guide-
lines for interstate relations and fundamental human rights provisions for individu-
als.36 This process changes the character of the international order and brings about
the normative idea of global constitutionalism-the idea that the rule of law and
human rights protection exist on the global scale. Proceeding from the value prem-
ise of "normative individualism," several scholars define global constitutionalism ac-
cording to a citizen's perspective." Such a value-laden constitutional reading is
strongly linked to the recognition of individuals as the new subject of international
law via the promotion of fundamental rights." This reading implies that modern
35. Cf. Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, MOD. L. REV., May 2002, at 317.
36. See Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional
Theory?, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALSM 3, 17 (Christian Joerges et al.
eds., 2004).
37. See, e.g., ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (1991); Richard Bellamy, The Political Form of the
Constitution: The Separation of Powers, Rights and Representative Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONAL-
ISM IN TRANSFORMATION 25, 43 (Richard Bellamy & Dario Castiglione eds., 1996); Petersmann,
supra note 3, at 641.
38. Bellamy, supra note 37, at 43; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Multilevel Trade Governance in the
WTO Requires Multilevel Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVER-
NANCE AND SOCIAL REGULATION, supra note 3, at 5, 9. There is a rough parallel to the perception of
constitutionalism as an "essentially liberal legalistic conception," which is "a formal framework of
rights," on the one hand, and a "political and republican understanding ofconstitutionalism" that
acknowledges the historically embedded role of politics as the "art of balancing, reducing and
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international law is no longer exclusively concerned with the regulation of state-to-
state relations, but also with individual-state relations.39
In this sense, the emerging idea of global constitutionalism is considered to be a
linkage of two specific sets of norms that evolve over time: the formal norms, which
comprise primarily the principle of the rule of law, and the substantive norms, most
importantly the guarantee of fundamental rights to individuals.4 ° By analogy to a
domestic constitution, the global constitution is the sum of basic legal norms that
comprehensively regulate the social and political life of an international polity. These
legal norms establish the rule of law and guarantee certain liberties and rights.41
The most recent and prominent example of an emerging constitutional system
beyond the nation-state is the attempt to set up a European constitutional order for
the European Community (EC) and the EU42 In addition, arguments in favor of
global constitutionalization have been put forward with respect to global trade and
the related establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO)4 3
So far, little effort has been made to advance a comprehensive and operational
framework of global constitutionalization. Depending on normative and disci-
plinary preferences, scholars have focused instead on single components of this
concept.44 Law scholars may be inclined to view constitutionalization in merely
formal or procedural terms. Liberal economists usually concentrate on the liberal
aspects related to constitutionalism, while many social scientists focus primarily
on the social and political instances of constitutionalization.
Despite widely varying readings of the global constitutional debate, two per-
ceptions of global constitutionalization stand out: constitutionalization as a uni-
tary and all-encompassing process on the one hand, and constitutionalization as
an assembly of several differentiated processes on the other. Although in practice
managing conflicts," on the other. Bellamy & Castiglione, supra note 29, at 414; see also Bellamy,
supra note 37, at 24.
39. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 60-67 (1950).
40. Cf. Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of
Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907, 909 (2004).
41. Horst Dippel, Modern Constitutionalism, An Introduction to a History in Need of Writing, 73
LEGAL HIST. REV. 153, 154 (2005).
42. See EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE, supra note 2; PETERS, supra note 17;
Justine Lacroix, Fora European Constitutional Patriotism, 50 POL. STUO. 944 (2002); Berthold Ritt-
berger & Frank Schimmelfennig, Explaining the Constitutionalization of the European Union, 13 J.
EUR. PUB. POL. 1148 (2006).
43. See, e.g., CAss,supra note 3; Cottier & Hertig, supra note 3; Howse & Nicolaidis, supra note 3;
Petersmann, supra note 3; Schloemann & Ohlhoffsupra note 3; Schorkopf & Walter, supra note 3;
Trachtman, supra note 3; see also Petersmann,supra note 38, at 11-18.
44. Cf. Walker, supra note 35, at 339-40.
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these positions fall more or less along a continuum, for illustrative purposes I sim-
plify the situation by distinguishing between the two extremes. Some theorists-
especially European law scholars-understand constitutionalism as a concept that
tries to establish international legal unity.45 In this respect, constitutionalism is
about a legal integration of states. Several scholars have postulated a universal
world constitution beyond the nation-state that is put into force by a world sover-
eign and legitimizes the exercise of global political power. In this regard, the U.N.
Charter is referred to as the constitutional document of the international commu-
nity. Accordingly, the United Nations is viewed as the primary institution that
furnishes the international community with the necessary international organs.46
The alternative to constitutionalization in terms of global constitutional unity
is global constitutional pluralism. Neil Walker-a staunch critic of global consti-
tutional unity-argues that a range of different constitutional sites and processes
exists. In his view, constitutionalism and constitutionalization are a "set of loosely
and variously coupled factors" that allow one to distinguish between different
forms of constitutionalism and to identify modes and degrees of constitutional-
ization. This contrasts with a constitutional reading in terms of black-and-white
and all-or-nothing.47 For instance, Nico Krisch understands pluralism in the con-
text of global administrative law as an alternative to the attempts at constitutional-
izing the global political order into a coherent unified framework. He argues that
a unified understanding of constitutionalization tends to downplay "the extent of
legitimate diversity in the global polity."'8 This diversity is triggered, on the one
hand, by the variety of global constituencies that cannot claim full regulatory le-
gitimacy and, on the other hand, by the diverging ways of exercising participatory
rights in the determination of the scope of the polity.49
Another strand of the pluralist conception is inspired by the sociological ap-
proach of Niklas Luhmann. Gunther Teubner, the most influential proponent of
45. See, e.g., de Wet,supra note 3; Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the
International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529, 533-34, 552 (1998); Peters, supra note 1.
46. See BARDo FASSBENDER, UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM AND THE RIGHT OF VETO 86-87
(1998); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations
Revisited, 1 MAX PLANCK Y.B.U.N.L. 1, 19 (1997); Ronald St. J. Macdonald, The Charter of the
United Nations in Constitutional Perspective, 20 AuSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 205, 206 (1999); Fassbender,
supra note 45, at 567-68. But see, e.g., Teubner, supra note 36, at 5.
47. Walker, supra note 35, at 339-40.
48. Nico Krisch, The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 247, 248 (2006).
49. Id. at 249.
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the Luhmannian system theory within legal studies, describes the difference be-
tween constitutional unity and constitutional plurality:
The constitution of world society does not come about exclusively in
the representative institutions of international politics, nor can it take
place in a unitary global constitution which overlies all areas of soci-
ety, but, instead, emerges incrementally in the constitutionalisation
of a multiplicity of autonomous subsystems of world society.5"
Global constitutional pluralism is thus associated with the emergence of dif-
ferent constitutional sites and processes that are configured in a horizontal, rather
than a hierarchical and vertical, pattern.5' It is concerned with the fragmentation
of international law-"the rise of specialized rules and rule-systems that have no
clear relationship to each other" 52-emerging from the horizontal nature of the
international legal system. Constitutionalization, in this regard, does not seek to
overcome fragmentation by creating legal unity in the international sphere, but
rather attempts to adapt to it by acknowledging the fragmented nature of the in-
ternational system. In other words, while global constitutional unity aims at the
creation of the global unitary constitution, differentiated constitutionalization
seeks to realize a multiplicity of autonomous subsystems in international politics.
It suggests global constitutional plurality.
In this context it is crucial to distinguish between two debates. One focuses on
the idealized distinction between unity and plurality of international law, and the
other focuses on societal versus state-based constitutionalization. While this article
focuses on the unity-plurality divide from a state-based perspective, it does not re-
flect on the role of societal forces (such as non-governmental actors) in the constitu-
tionalization process. There are two reasons for this state-focused approach. First,
current research is not able to quantify current societal developments in interna-
tional relations. This prevents any empirical research on the topic. Second, even
though societal actors might be pivotal in advocating global constitutionalization
(for example, by stimulating the content of international law, setting the interna-
50. Teubner, supra note 36, at 8.
51. Walker, supra note 35, at 337; see also Gunther Teubner, "Global Bukowina". Legal Pluralism
in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
52. International Law Commission, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Com-
mission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expan-
sion of International Law, 483, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 14, 2006) (finalized by Martti
Koskenniemi).
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tional legal agenda, promoting human rights, humanitarian and environmental
law, or mobilizing states and leveraging public opinion), 3 it is the states that produce
international law. In this regard, Jean Cohen also argues that the importance of
emerging societal forces is overestimated by systems theorists. According to Cohen,
the "international society of states"-in contrast to the cosmopolitan order of soci-
etal forces-remains the core of the world political system. 4
III. STEPS TOWARD GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
In order to counteract the tendency to segregate constitutional aspects and to
develop a comprehensive typology of global constitutionalization that captures
the diversity, plurality and heterogeneity of the international order at the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century, it is necessary to include both formal and sub-
stantive dimensions. At the same time, it is essential to take into account the
underlying time dimension in a single framework. In referring to emerging global
constitutionalism as a process of building up a legal order based on fundamental
norms of a polity, we must understand that it is not only an encompassing and
completed global constitutional system that ought to be labeled global constitu-
tionalism; the intermediate steps representing the ongoing process of constitu-
tionalization must be considered of equal importance.
A. Formal Aspects of Global Constitutionalization
Law at the international level, just as at the nation-state level, undergoes a
process of organization and institutionalization. The principle of the rule of law
refers in a strictly national context to the control and limit of political power, in-
cluding a scheme of checks and balances achieved through the separation of pow-
ers.55 Translated to the international sphere, this implies that political entities must
act within established legal frameworks and according to established procedures.
It is a selection of rules providing an institutional setting with formal guidelines
53. See CIVILIZING WORLD SOCIETY: SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY BEYOND THE STATE (Mathias Al-
bert et al. eds., 2000); Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law,
100 AM. J. INT'L L. 348,359-61 (2006); John W. Meyer et al., World Society and the Nation-State, 103
AM. J. Soc. 144 (1997).
54. Cohen, supra note 4, at 13, 24.
55. See FULLER, SUpra note 20, at 33-94; HART, supra note 19; SAj6,supra note 18, at 205-06.
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for political and legal actions in the field of international relations.56 The principle
of the rule of law empirically refers to relations between nation-states, and thus
implies that international law is a regulatory instrument limited to the regulation
of interstate relations. The rule of law principle, as embedded in the idea of con-
stitutionalization, lends international law its formal character."
Therefore, before becoming capable of constituting the substance of law, the
formal principle of an international rule of law must be expressed in law. This
process of establishing an international legal order is called formal constitutional-
ization (type I in Table 1) and is considered to be the starting point of global con-
stitutionalization. Examples include the U.N. Charter, the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
The establishment of norms regulating interstate relations may change noth-
ing for individuals since they do not address the relationship among individuals or
between individuals and states. These norms are, however, a necessary require-
ment for the guarantee of individual rights in the international community. In
order to make a difference to the individual, it is essential to integrate the substan-
tive dimension into the concept of global constitutionalization.
B. Substantive Aspects of Global Constitutionalization
The substantive dimension embodied in the concept of constitutionalization
refers to the international protection of fundamental human rights.58 In contrast
to the formal understanding of international law based on the old doctrine of
state sovereignty, which was mainly devoted to the immunities of states, their dip-
lomatic representatives, and their property, the emergence of international funda-
mental rights is a rather recent phenomenon. It goes hand in hand with the
recognition of the individual as the ultimate subject of modern international law
by acknowledgement of fundamental rights. Thus, the recognition of human
rights is synonymous with the recognition of the individual as the subject of inter-
national law. It implies that modern international law is no longer exclusively con-
cerned with the regulation of state-to-state relations but also with relations
between the individual and the state. Further, it brings to mind that the often
56. JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 45 (2006); HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT 990 (2d ed. 2000).
57. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 39, at 60-67.
58. Cf CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM (2003).
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conflicting collective good, as represented internally and externally by the sover-
eign, is conditioned by the goods of the individual human beings who compose
the collectivity.59 I call this constitutional component substantive since interna-
tional law functions in this respect as a patron and safeguard of fundamental
rights granted to individuals.
When referring to fundamental human rights, it is unavoidable to speak of
human rights in terms of "generations,"6 implying that international human
rights have evolved throughout history following a temporal sequence. Although
this generational concept is far from being a popular theoretical and analytical
tool in scholarly literature, it is a useful framework for the purpose of conceptual-
izing the emerging patterns of global constitutionalization.
International human rights are considered to be the "offspring of the human
rights that were originally codified at the national level."'" The substance of what
was first guaranteed within a national framework was only later adopted in an
international set of rules.62 With regard to the national level, Thomas Marshall
conceptualizes human rights by the notion of citizenship.63 He distinguishes be-
tween civil, political, and social citizenship, the last denoting a range of rights
ensuring a basic minimum of economic welfare and security."M Following this, the
earliest version of citizenship was conceived of as a collection of civil rights, which
were subsequently supplemented by political rights and, lastly, by social rights.
Like Marshall, the international law scholar Karel Vasak makes a similar dis-
59. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 39, at 61-67.
60. Note that the generational account of rights is often associated with the conception of negative
and positive rights. Negative rights come close to the first generation of human rights. They prohibit
certain government actions. Positive rights correspond to the second and third generations of human
rights. They impose moral obligations on governments to provide public goods and services. See
Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY 166-81 (Isaiah Berlin & Henry Hardy eds., 2002).
Negative and positive rights should be not confused with claim rights and liberty rights. Both liberty
and claim rights can take on positive and negative features. Claim rights impose a duty or obligation
for a party. Liberty rights, by contrast, are associated with a freedom from duty. A positive claim
right is the duty of one party to do something for another party, and a negative claim right is the duty
of one party to refrain from doing something to another party. The freedom to do something is a
positive liberty right, the freedom to refrain from doing something is a negative liberty right. See
generally JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 198-205 (1980).
61. ToMUSCHATsupra note 58, at 25.
62. Id.
63. See generally THOMAS H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS (1950). For a description
of the nation-based development of human rights, see also ToMUSCHATsupra note 58, at 70-83.
64. MARSHALL,SUpra note 63. Cf Ralf Dahrendorf, Citizenship and Beyond: The Social Dynamics of
an Idea, 41 Soc. RES. 673 (1974); Ralf Dahrendorf, A Precarious Balance: Economic Opportunity, Civil
Society, and Political Liberty, RESPONSIVE CMTY., Summer 1995, at 13.
EMERGING GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
tinction.65 Drawing on the French Revolution, he differentiates between three gen-
erations of international human rights: libert6 (civil and political rights, first
generation); 6galit6 (economic, social, and cultural rights, second generation); and
fraternit6 (solidarity rights, third generation).66 Finding their expression in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, human rights of the first generation are civil
and political liberties. When referring to human rights of the second generation,
one means economic and social rights.
As the process of global constitutionalization is also expected to embrace sub-
stantive norms, civil-political as well as socio-economic rights are considered to be
integral parts of this development in international law. I call the institutionalization
of international human rights provisions substantive constitutionalization (type II in
Table 1).
C. Civil-Political Dimension of Constitutionalization
Most contemporary scholars view civil and political rights as being prior and
primary when compared to social and economic rights.67 They are considered to
be the first generation of rights dealing exclusively with the concern of liberty as
expressed in freedom of speech, movement, and religion, security of person, and
65. Karel Vasak, A 30-Year Struggle, UNESCO COUR., Nov. 1977, at 29.
66. Human rights of the third generation comprise rights such as the right to development,
peace, environmental protection, and self-determination. In contrast to rights of the first and sec-
ond generation, these collective rights have not yet reached the formal status of "hard law" and thus do
not find expression in international law documents, but rather have the nature of political propos-
als (cf TOMUSCHAT, supra note 58, at 24; C&ile Fabre, Constitutionalising Social Rights, 6 J. POL.
PHIL. 263 (1998)) and are not considered further here.
67. Note that issue of priority among types of human rights is subject to controversy. See CHARLES
FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 178 (1978); Ruth Gavison, On the Relationship Between Civiland Political
Rights, and Social and Economic Rights, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 23, 36 (Jean-
Marc Coicaude et al. eds., 2003). Hugo Bedau and Maurice Cranston argue that due to the essen-
tially negative character of first generation rights, traditional civil and political rights deserve
priority over social and economic rights. See MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS?
(1964); Hugo A. Bedau, Human Rights and Foreign Assistance Programs, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 29, 35 (Peter G. Brown & Douglas MacLean eds., 1979). Henry Shue, on the
other hand, maintains that the distinction between negative and positive rights bears no moral
significance. He argues that all human rights have both negative and positive components. See
HENRY SHOE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 35-37 (1980);
Henry Shue, Rights in the Light of Duties, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLicY, supra at 65,
71-75. Also, according to the U.N. ideology, human rights are regarded to be "interdependent and
indivisible." See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
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the right to political participation.6" From a historical, national perspective, citi-
zenship in its earliest version included civil rights comprised of the rights neces-
sary for the freedom of the individual-liberty of the person, liberty of thought,
and liberty of faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and
the right to justice.69
However, since civil rights are bound to remain empty promises for those
who lack not only the economic means to make use of them, but also the political
rights to make sure that the rule of law is not systematically turned to the advan-
tage of some groups over others, political rights have emerged over time to supple-
ment civil rights. This political element stands for the right to participate in the
exercise of political power and the guarantee of political freedom, including the
right to vote, to stand for election, to form political groups, and to voice political
views freely.7" These political rights are important additive elements that enrich
the global constitutional order.
The civil-political dimension of constitutionalization indicates the simultane-
ous emergence of civil and political rights. With regard to the international con-
text, human rights of the first generation do not imply that a global political
citizenship-with citizens equipped with the right to vote for international gov-
erning bodies-is feasible. Rather, these rights indicate the opportunity for indi-
viduals to claim their personal freedoms, such as the right to seek redress if injured
by another, the right of peaceful protest, and the right to a fair investigation and
trial if suspected of a crime. This concept also refers to equal treatment of indi-
viduals irrespective of race, sex, or class. In other words, institutionalization of
civil and political rights means that individuals are protected from the coercive
power of governing authorities and are granted the liberty to participate in (inter-
national) politics. Civil and political rights are concerned with individual free-
doms, implying the negative right not to be interfered with in forbidden ways.7'
The international institution most concerned with basic standards of personal lib-
erties is the Human Rights Committee,72 a U.N. entity comprised of a body of
68. See JACK DONNELLY, THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 61-67 (1985); Daniel Kaufmann,
Human Rights and Governance: The Empirical Challenge, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT:
TOWARDS MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT 352 (Philip Alston & Mary Robinson eds., 2005).
69. TOMUSCHATSUpra note 58, at 24; Fabre, supra note 66, at 265.
70. See Dahrendorf, Citizenship and Beyond,supra note 64, at 680-81.
71. See FRIED,SUpra note 67, at 110.
72. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights was replaced as of March 15, 2006 by the
newly created United Nations Human Rights Council. G.A. Res. 60/251, U.N. Doc A/RES/60/251
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independent experts that monitors implementation of the International Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights by the state parties.
D. Socio-Economic Dimension of Constitutionalization
Substantive global constitutionalization cannot be limited to civil and politi-
cal rights. Although this category of rights is awarded primacy because it is con-
cerned with individual freedoms,73 it, too, is bound to remain insufficient so long
as economic and social differences prevent people from acquiring the means to
exercise their liberties.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, increasingly global transactions
call for the consideration of redistributive aspects addressing "new global risks."
These risks are related to the principle of equality, which finds expression in the
second generation of human rights. These rights are social and economic in na-
ture. Social and economic rights pursue the creation of a level playing field for all
individuals by setting common standards with regard to economic liberalization
as well as social development.74
Economic rights75 comprise market-enabling measures aimed at the abolition
of protectionist rules and the redress of inequality of opportunities for economic
activity between citizens of different nations.76 The creation of the Internal Mar-
ket of the European Community, the WTO and its General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),
and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) are major examples of such a "negative integration." Economic rights
brought about by the WTO can be seen as important means of global
constitutionalization.
(Apr. 3, 2006), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/A.RES.60.251-
En.pdf.
73. Gavison, supra note 67, at 69.
74. TomuscHAvsupra note 58, at 24; Fabre, supra note 66, at 265.
75. Recent literature has also pointed to economic rights as elements of an enlarged concept of
civil rights, indicating the right to trade and the right to market access, as well as the protection of
civil liberties and properties. See CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY:
THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2001); Tom Bottomore, Citizenship and Social
Class, Forty Years On, in T.H. MARSHALL & TOM BOTTOMORE, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS 55
(1992); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, From "Negative" to "Positive" Integration in the WTO: Time for
"Mainstreaming Human Rights" into WTO Law?, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1363 (2000).
76. DONNELLY, supra note 68, at 90-96; ToMUSCHAT, supra note 58, at 24; Fabre, supra note 66, at
265; Kaufmann, supra note 68.
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However, economic liberties may damage the individuals' social rights. One
could even argue that, while economic rights, in constitutional terms, protect in-
dividuals by creating a level playing field, they simultaneously damage the prin-
ciple of protection of the individual because individuals are now exposed to
international markets and thus are much more vulnerable than in a closed econo-
my.77 Liberalization is acceptable only if there is concomitantly some sort of com-
pensation offered in the field of labor and social security.
Therefore, social rights must also be considered. Social rights are rights to
claim some limited goods,7" such as the right to work, education, health care, so-
cial security, and a minimum standard of living. Social rights provide a response
to these new requirements. These rights also include social provisions covering
the risks of loss of income after retirement or during periods of unemployment.7 9
In contrast to the establishment of economic rights via the liberalization policies
of the WTO, the creation of social security implies the setting of common stan-
dards. Arguably, the international institutions that are most concerned with the
setting of basic social standards are the International Labour Organization (ILO),
the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation of the United Nations (FAO).
In sum, global constitutionalization is closely linked to the substantive idea of
fundamental rights of the first and second generations as well as the formal princi-
ple of the rule of law. Since global constitutionalization is not an ad hoc event, but
rather a long-term process consisting of intermediate stages, its elements can be di-
vided into three sub-processes. At the first stage, the emergence of the formal aspect
should become visible. At the second stage, global constitutionalization is supple-
mented by substantive rights, comprised primarily human rights of the first genera-
tion and followed by human rights of the second generation. Combining basic civil
liberties and political freedoms, the substantive constitutional norms meet in the
form of the civil-political dimension of global constitutionalization. Only then do
social and economic rights of the second generation enter the field. Since economic
rights threaten the individual's right to social security, and social rights endanger
the individual's right to economic freedom, they can be considered both conflicting
77. See PETER J. KATZENSTEIN, SMALL STATES IN WORLD MARKETS: INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN Eu-
ROPE (1985); David R. Cameron, The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis, 72
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1243, 1251 (1978).
78. Cf FRIED, supra note 67, at 110.
79. TOMUSCHAT, supra note 58, at 24; Fabre,supra note 66, at 265.
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and subsidiary in nature. Supplementation with this socio-economic constitutional
dimension accomplishes the process of substantive constitutionalization.
Global constitutionalization, in its final stage, encompasses both formal and
substantive entities, the latter being based on the effective institutionalization of
civil and political rights as well as of economic and social rights. This encompass-
ing global constitutionalization (type III in Table 1) represents a combination of
formal norms guiding interstate relations and the institutionalization of human
rights provisions for individuals. It is a manifestation of the balancing between
individual and collective rights, positive and negative rights, and formal mecha-
nisms and substantive norms.
TABLE 1: Types of Global Constitutionalization
Institutionalization of formal norms
(procedural guidelines for interstate relations)
No Yes
I. Formal
Institutionalization of No No constitutionalization
substantive provisions constitutionalization
(human rights for 11. Substantive III. Encompassing global
individuals) Yes
constitutionalization constitutionalization
CONCLUSION
This article addresses a basic, but essential, issue of global constitutionaliza-
tion, thus far neglected by scholars of international relations, and argues that this
originally legal concept requires a consistent definition that would enable scholars
of international relations, as well as of comparative politics, to examine, in an em-
pirical manner, its significance with regard to the changing international order.
The purpose of this article was to explore a consistent and operational framework
of global constitutionalization. Such a framework should take into account the
diversity of the international order, but at the same time not reduce its meaning to
an overly exclusive definition.
Starting from the nation-state setting, three fundamental constitutional ele-
ments have been identified: the formal principle of the international rule of law,
the substantive dimension representing human rights provisions, and the time
factor allowing for gradual emergence of a global constitutional order. Drawing a
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parallel to the developments of domestic law, I distinguished among three types
of global constitutionalization: formal constitutionalization, suggesting the insti-
tutionalization of procedural guidelines for interstate relations; substantive con-
stitutionalization, indicating the institutionalization of human rights provisions
for individuals comprising civil-political and socio-economic rights; and encom-
passing global constitutionalization, implying the simultaneous emergence, cre-
ation, and identification of formal and substantive international norms.
This article neither proves the existence of global constitutionalization nor
examines which national and international conditions might favor or hinder the
emergence of a global constitution. But it provides some structural guidance on
how to make operational the concept of global constitutionalization and thereby
make it empirically approachable by scholars of international relations and politi-
cal science. So far, studies concerned with global constitutionalization have mainly
approached this subject area from a normative angle. Since the concept has a
strong anchor in international law, this is not surprising. Almost no attempts have
been made to assess the process of global constitutionalization empirically. The
exceptions are studies conducted in the European context."0
This article offers some guidelines for making this framework operational
insofar as it distinguishes among elements embedded in the concept of global
constitutionalization. As outlined above, these constitutional elements refer, in
general, to norms. The most conventional norms on the international plane are
international agreements." International agreements have some common ele-
ments. They are written and binding instruments that establish legal rights and
80. See, e.g., ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE
(2000); Rittberger & Schimmelfennig, supra note 42. These studies demonstrate that constitution-
alization as an ongoing project is empirically quantifiable when compared to the normative con-
cept of constitutionalism. They also demonstrate that constitutional mechanisms, such as
judicialization and politicization of policymaking (STONE SWEET, supra), as well as parliamental-
ization and institutionalization of human rights (Rittberger & Schimmelfennig, supra note 42),
have an impact on European Union and member-state politics.
81. By "international agreement" I refer to international norms. International agreements em-
brace the widest range of international instruments, including treaties, conventions, charters, and
covenants, which are rather formal and universal, covering a relatively broad range of functional
areas, as well as protocols and amendments that generally refer to less formal agreements. Follow-
ing the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(l)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
an "international agreement" is "concluded between States in written form and governed by inter-
national law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and
whatever its particular designations[.]" See INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS 129 (Malcolm D.
Evans ed., 8th ed. 2007).
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duties and require ratification82 by state parties. National ratification behavior
might be an essential starting point for an empirical examination of global consti-
tutionalization. Although studies concerned with the issue of state commitment
to international agreements are frequent in the field of international relations,
they tend to focus on one agreement or a small selection of agreements.83 With
regard to global constitutionalization, a more appropriate structure would need to
provide for a "multi-treaty" framework and allow one to study "cross-treaty" rati-
fication behavior. So far, no systemic analyses providing for such a multi-treaty
framework have been conducted. To this end, it would be necessary to compile
suitable data on the ratification of international agreements relevant to the con-
cept of global constitutionalization.
This article offers some direction for the selection of international agreements
relevant to the concept of global constitutionalization. Given that the legal ele-
ments central to global constitutionalization have been defined as international
norms containing formal guidelines for interstate relations on the one hand, and
substantive fundamental human rights provisions for individuals (covering the
first and second generation of human rights) on the other, systematic empirical
investigation of global constitutionalization should in particular focus on a choice
of international agreements having these constitution-like characteristics.84
Certainly, by focusing on the ratification of constitution-like international
82. "Ratification" means several possible treaty actions-acceptance, approval, and accession-
that have the same legal effect as ratification and lead to an internationally binding arrangement.
Vienna Convention, supra note 81, art. 2 (1)(b).
83. See, e.g., Jay Goodliffe & Darren G. Hawkins, Explaining Commitment: States and the Con-
vention Against Torture, 68 J. PoL. 358 (2006); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui,
Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 AM. J. Soc. 1373 (2005);
Oona A. Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?, 51 J. CONFLICT RESOL.
588 (2007); Eric Neumayer, Death Penalty Abolition and the Ratification of the Second Optional
Protocol, 12 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 3 (2008); Beth Simmons, International Law and State Behavior:
Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 819 (2000);
James R. Vreeland, Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United
Nations Convention Against Torture, 62 INT'L ORG. 65 (2008); Christine Min Wotipka & Franzisco
0. Ramirez, World Society and Human Rights: An Event History Analysis of the Convention on the
Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination Against Women, in THE GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF MARKETS
AND DEMOCRACY 303 (Beth Simmons et al. eds., 2008).
84. Note that the number of international agreements in force is incredibly large and increasing.
See JACKSON, supra note 56, at 42. A few examples representing some constitution-like elements on
the international plane are the U.N. Charter, core human rights treaties with amendments and
optional protocols, the Geneva Conventions, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the
Convention on the Law of the Sea, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Agreement
Establishing the WTO, and fundamental international labor conventions.
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agreements, only part of the constitutionalization process can be captured. Such
an approach does not capture global constitutionalization characteristics like soci-
etal forces and judicial review. Nonetheless, ratification of quasi-constitutional
agreements represents a conditio sine qua non for the emergence of a global con-
stitutional order, and a feasible starting point for empirical research.
In studying a systematic, multi-treaty global constitutionalist framework,
three questions could be tackled empirically. First, we might address the issue of
whether the process of global constitutionalization is actually taking place around
the globe, measuring the frequency and pace of national commitment to interna-
tional, constitution-like agreements over time and space. Second, following the
normative distinction between global constitutional unity and global constitu-
tional pluralism, we might study which constitutional model-the unitary or the
pluralist (differentiating between the formal and substantive, and in turn, the
civil-political and socio-economic constitutional processes)-is best suited to de-
scribe real developments in international law. Finally, moving beyond mere de-
scriptive research objectives, empirical analysis should be able to identify forces
impeding or facilitating constitutionalization processes on the global scale by ex-
amining the effects of specific national and international conditions on national
commitment to these constitution-like international agreements.
This article does not claim that this constitutional scaffold and the study of
state commitment to international constitution-like agreements represent global
constitutionalization with its all-embracing characteristics. This formulation cap-
tures only part of the larger constitutional picture. As such, it ignores structural
issues of global authority, including principles and structures for the establish-
ment of global legislation, the exercise of global executive power, and the opera-
tion of global adjudicatory capacity. Furthermore, such a conceptualization omits
the role of societal forces, like non-governmental organizations, transnational ac-
tors, or public-private partnerships, in the international system.5 However, it
might provide for a first empirical insight into the pace and process of global con-
stitutionalization and thus deepen our understanding of the phenomenon.
85. As lawyers with a systems theory background argue, the process of global constitutionaliza-
tion not only incorporates states, but also societal forces. See, e.g., CIVILIZING WORLD SociETy, supra
note 53; Meyer, supra note 53; Teubner, supra note 36; Teubner, supra note 51. Cohen counters that
the importance of these newly emerging societal forces is overestimated by systems theorists. Ac-
cording to Cohen, the "international society of states," in contrast to the cosmopolitan order of
societal forces, remains the core of the world political system. It aims first and foremost at the co-
ordination of the two main principles as evident in international relations today: sovereign equality
of states and fundamental human rights. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 13, 24.
